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A commentary on
A “Source” of Error: Computer Code, Criminal Defendants, and the Constitution
by Chessman, C. (2017). Calif. Law Rev. 105, 101–193.
Chessman (2017) warns of the current trend to admit into court unchallenged the results of
complex computerized calculations. He provides a number of examples and arguments claimed
to demonstrate the need for open source software to remove the “black box” element. We agree
with parts of this sentiment, and the topic of this special issue, that there is a danger with those
using and receiving information from black box systems.
Some care however is needed with simple diagnoses and prescriptions such as these.
Modern probabilistic genotyping software are replacing methods previously applied manually.
We have great confidence in the forensic community with regard to both integrity and dedication.
The previously applied processes are usually a composite of standard operating procedure and
human judgment. The difference between these and probabilistic software is largely that the
processes in the software are encoded.
Many disciplines are sufficiently broad that practitioners need to rely, in part, on the work of
others. This is not new (for a discussion on this point see Taylor, 2016). The risk to which Chessman
refers arises when the individual using the system has so little understanding that they do not know
how to use the system, or when it has not worked1. Chessman provides some helpful suggestions
for how breaking down black box barriers can be addressed on an individual and systemic scale.
As developers of expert system STRmixTM2 (Taylor et al., 2013), we wish to address some of the
alarmist points in Chessman (and echoed by others3) that gives the impression that producers of
expert systems are all either incompetent or corrupt.
We first wish to correct a couple of points in (Chessman, 2017). Regarding the “erroneous
assumption” referenced by footnotes 49–51: This miscode, and indeed any miscode found that has
been identified in STRmixTM development or use, was identified by examination of the program’s
output and not the source code. It would be nearly impossible to identify subtle errors in code
by viewing the code. The identification has always been a result of comparison of the results
produced by a program to some known control4. The results of these comparisons then trigger
the examination of a specific section of the code in order to discover the source of the discrepancy.
1Note that this is not an issue with just computer programs, recent history has numerous examples within forensic biology
showing that a misunderstanding of the way a systemworks at a fundamental level can cause issues even when the calculations
themselves are relatively simple and able to be done by hand (Budowle and Bieber, 2015).
2An expert system that analyses STR DNA profile data.
3For example see EPIC (https://epic.org/state-policy/foia/dna-software/).
4Commonly a “by-hand” recreation of the expected value(s).
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Even as developers, during the developmental validation of new
versions of STRmixTM, we utilize the extended outputs of the
software to validate, and do not validate by examination of
code. A further reference (footnote 98) makes the same incorrect
assumption that it was code review that lead to the discovery of
a programming error. Our experience has been that even more
crucial than a review of source code, is the ability to have access
to outputs that demonstrate each step of a calculation. We should
also note that our ongoing evaluation and testing of the software
is a marker of continuous validation and refinement, rather than
just fixing “errors” and “blunders.”
The second point we wish to make is that the type and
magnitude of miscodes are important to consider. The majority
of programming errors will lead to instances of a program
“crashing” or failing to produce an answer. These types of
errors are arguably inconsequential as they will not lead to any
erroneous results being produced. More serious are miscodes
where no errors are identified or displayed by the software.
These can be split into those that will be clearly identifiable5
and those that are more subtle and may go initially unnoticed.
Even in this latter category, the question should be asked “What
effect does this error have?” If the magnitude of the difference
in the result caused by the miscode is small compared with the
natural variability in the results being produced6 then arguably
the consequences are minimal. We are by no means suggesting
that that these types of errors are acceptable, they should be
rectified as soon as found. We simply suggest that they tend
to be used for scaremongering in a manner disproportionate
to their impact. Case in point is the oft quoted article (David
Murray, 2015), which contains the never quoted sentence “The
DNA likelihood ratios in both the new and original statements
appear to be the same.”
We agree with the suggestion of Chessman that source code
should be available for scrutiny. STRmixTM abides by one of the
mechanisms that Chessman suggests, namely the ability for code
to be disclosed under confidentiality agreements7. We note that
running of STRmixTM is just the final step in a long journey
of computerized activities that ultimately lead to an answer.
5Such as value of a probability greater than one, or a negative amount of some
substance.
6This may either be in the raw results due to inherent variability in the laboratory
process or it may be variability in the statistical result due to an evaluation method
that utilizes random number generation (Bright et al., 2015).
7The code of STRmixTM has been viewed under such conditions in the past.
A true challenge of all steps in the process would require the
examination of the source code underlying the Java programming
language in which STRmixTM is written, the WindowsTM
operating system on which it is run, the software used to process
the raw electrophoretic data, the software used to collect the
raw electrophoretic data from the electrophoresis instrument,
the code used to run the electrophoresis instrument, the PCR
thermocycler, the quantification instrument and a myriad of
no doubt thousands of blocks of code that sit within the
numerous Peripheral Interface Controllers that control hardware
components.
With the advent of complex computerized evaluation of
evidence, there is a shift from a time where an expert can
testify to all aspects of the evaluation, to one where, at some
level, the workings of an expert system are accepted without
absolute understanding. This may initially seem frightening,
but an examination of the bigger picture suggests otherwise.
It would be difficult to argue that the use of computerized
breathalyzers is a backwards step from the reliability of the
Field Sobriety Test. Similarly, virtually all senior advisory
bodies relating to DNA profile evaluation recognize the
clear benefits of the probabilistic interpretation systems
(which by nature of their complexity require computerized
implementation) over the preceding manual or binary
interpretation methods (Coble et al., 2015; SWGDAM, 2015).
In our efforts to ensure that software is not the “source”
of errors, it is important to recognize that even with the
noted occurrences of these errors, the current computerized
solutions, when used by trained experts, represent a vast
improvement to the quality and reliability of evidence presented
in court.
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